

POLICING FOR THE PEOPLE OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO:
THE INTEGRITY FACTOR

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ABSTRACT

Policing for the People of Trinidad and Tobago: The Integrity Factor

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This research investigated the perception of the levels of integrity held by police officers of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service as an indicator of the levels of corruption that exist in the organization. This examination extended to officers' perception of the levels of codes of silence that exists among their fellow officers and how that relates to their perception of their integrity and their commitment to the organization.

This research was quantitative in nature; a survey was conducted with one hundred and fifty-two police officers of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service participating. The questionnaire consisted of three sections; Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator, Organizational Commitment Survey and a Demographics Questionnaire. The resulting data was analysed using the Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences.

The results showed that officers have a high perception of their levels of integrity which is in disparity with the results that showed a high level of code of silence among the officers.

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Chapter One

Introduction

“Police corruption is the lack of police integrity. It also constitutes one of the most significant obstacles to positive police-public relations in today’s society.” Grant (2002)

In June of 2004 Stephen D. Mastrofski a criminologist from George Mason University was retained by the government of Trinidad and Tobago to conduct an assessment of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Mastrofski identified a number of management shortfalls which he characterized as priorities for improving the Police Service. A salient issue that he focused on in his report was the concept of corruption in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). Mastrofski advised in his report that the measurement of corruption is a daunting task and a more achievable objective would be the measurement of the levels of integrity. He advised that the research entitled “The Measurement of Police Integrity” done by Klockars et al (2000) had provided the ideal instrument for evaluating officers’ perceptions of their levels of their integrity. The level of integrity is the reverse of the level of corruption. One can rationalize how corrupt an organization is by finding out the levels of integrity of that organization; if integrity is high, corruptions is low and vice-versa.

Mastrofski's report was so pertinent that he was hired to implement his ideas to overhaul the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. His concept of 'Policing for the People' became the watch words for change in the Police Service. This was followed by his 'Model Station' initiative which saw the conversion of five local police stations into a more customer friendly environment. Mastrofski however never initiated the measurement of the perception of the integrity levels of police officers as he had suggested, although the issue of corruption in the TTPS remained a highly relevant concern.

Background of the Study

The major purpose of this research is to fill this gap left by Mastrofski by undertaking the study of the measurement of the perception of the integrity of the police officers in the TTPS. The research sought to remove ambiguity and to present a different perspective on the question of what is the level of corruption in the TTPS. This research also investigated the police officers' perception of their levels of code of silence and how it relates to their levels of integrity. The theory of the code of silence refers to police officers' unquestionable support for each other; it is a theory which is unique to police organizations (Klockars, 2004). According to this concept, police officers are often accused of turning a blind eye to the wrongs committed by their fellow officers.

The research also examined the officers' commitment to the organization and the relationship between commitment and their perception of their integrity and the code of silence. This was necessary in order to fully comprehend the strength of the relationship of the two constructs - integrity and code of silence.

Rationale

The study of the integrity of police officers in the TTPS was undertaken to provide clarity and empirical evidence in the issue of police corruption. In recent years Trinidad and Tobago has experienced an unprecedented escalation in the commission of crimes and in particular murders. Whilst there are a number of social issues linked to the causality of the crime wave, one of the major focus points has been the police service. The public perception is that the police service is corrupt (Pfaff, 2010). This has led to national and international discourse on the levels of corruption in the TTPS. Nationally there have been several commissions of inquiry into illegal activities within the TTPS. The two most recent commissions, the Garvin Scott Drug Report (1987) and the Scotland Yard Report (1993) both failed to elicit substantial evidence to prosecute and convict alleged corrupt officers. The reports have tainted the integrity of the officers of the TTPS.

Similar accusations of corruption in the TTPS have been made by renowned international organizations. Amnesty International in their Annual Report for 2011

has accused the officers of the TTPS of unlawful killings. Also, the U.S. Department of State in their human rights report published on 11/3/10 states that police corruption in the TTPS continued to be a problem. In the article entitled “5000 guns in lock up” in the Trinidad Express, Camini Marajh noted that the United Nations Development Programme is concerned about the use of firearms in crimes which were previously seized by TTPS officers. Particularly mentioned was an event in 2009 when thirty-eight TTPS officers were transferred out of the St Joseph Police Station after illegal guns and drugs were discovered hidden in the ceiling of that building. No convictions have resulted from investigations.

The phenomenon of corruption in the TTPS is an area of study with a limited body of research. One of the few researchers is Pfaff (2010) who investigated police perception of corruption in three Caribbean nations including the officers of the TTPS. Pfaff’s study indicated that not only did the officers of the TTPS perceive the organization as corrupt; but that the officers also know that the public view them as corrupt. Pfaff however utilized one question ‘Do you think the TTPS is corrupt?’ to elicit the perception of corruption from the officers. This limitation may have resulted in bias findings as such a direct question may be viewed as offensive. Also, a broad term as corruption framed into a single question may have created ambiguity in the minds of the officers as they may each define corruption differently.

Research Design

The present research was designed to utilize the survey instrument created by Klockars et al (2000). Klockars and his team adopted the reverse approach of investigating corruption by examining the integrity of police officers. Their first such survey was conducted in the United States of America. Their instrument, the Perception of Integrity Indicator, was created to measure police officers perception of their own integrity and not their feelings about the organization. Integrity and corruption are viewed by Klockars as the two polar points on a continuum. The questionnaire provides eleven scenarios of corrupt police activities each different in the gravity of seriousness of the offence committed. Officers are required to rate how serious they believe the offences to be on a Likert scale of one being not serious to five being very serious. High scores mean a high integrity while low scores mean low integrity and more importantly an acceptance of corruption. Klockars also utilised the eleven scenarios to elicit from officers the levels of their perception of the code of silence that exist in their organization.

Westmarland (2005) further divided the Klockars eleven scenarios into three categories of police corruption; the administrative, the noble cause and the criminal. Similar studies have been successfully conducted in countries such as Japan (Johnson, 2003), Turkey (Kucukuysal 2008) and the Netherlands (Huberts et al, 2003) and have provided a more reliable review on the construct of police corruption.

This research, being quantitative in nature, utilized a questionnaire which consisted of three sections - the Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator, the Organizational Commitment Survey and Demographics. The survey was conducted among one hundred and fifty-two police officers from various sections of the TTPS. The results were statistically analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

The research is divided into five chapters, the first being the introduction. The second chapter is the literature review of the concept of police corruption, including its definition and the different ways it has been explained through research. Chapter three is the explanation of the methodology of the research. Chapter four provides the statistical results of the study utilizing the SPSS programme. Also included is a comprehensive analysis of the results and its relevance to the study. Chapter five provides the discussion, recommendation and conclusion of the study.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

The purpose of this research is to investigate police officers' of the TTPS perception of their levels of integrity in order to comprehend the levels of corruption that exist

in the organization. A lack of integrity alludes to a penchant for corruption. Additionally, this research examines the perception officers have of the levels of code of silence that exist in the TTPS. Analyses are also conducted to reveal the relationship between the officers' perception of their integrity and their code of silence, and whether these concepts are related to officers' organizational commitment.

The literature review begins with a definition for police corruption; this section also delves into the difficulty experienced by other researchers in defining the concept. Furthermore, the review continues with a contemporary overview of the extent to which police corruption has affected the TTPS. This is followed by an in-depth appraisal of three leading theories offered to explain the concept of police corruption. They are the rotten apple, rotten barrel and the rotten orchard theories (Pfaff, 2010). The review then examines the 'code of silence' a construct that is unique to police organization and one that has a profound influence on police corruption (Klockars, 2000). This construct's influence is investigated in this research.

Data compiled on another unique concept to police organizations the 'noble cause corruption' is also examined to understand the different types of police corruption and why it might be accepted by uncorrupted officers. The work of Carl Klockars and the Perception Integrity Indicator, the main study that influences this research, is examined. The concept of organizational commitment is examined to

comprehend the difference in obligation that police officers hold as compared to their allegiance to the 'code of silence'. Finally, the review examines the solutions suggested to curb police corruption by researchers who have investigated the concept.

Police Corruption

Police corruption is wide ranging in nature and its conceptualization encompasses a holistic approach into the function of the police that should include procedural, criminal and civic violations. The essential nature of policing demands that corruption should include any member of the police service who fails to perform his or her duty, or commits any act that is contrary to the very laws he/she is responsible for upholding.

Kleinig (1999:7) in his definition of the issue states “ *Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private, departmental/divisional advantage*”.

Sayed and Bruce (1998:8), provided clarity in their definition: “*Police corruption is any illegal activity or misconduct involving the use of occupational power for personal, group, or organizational gain*”.

A working definition of police corruption therefore involves an abuse of police authority which may be committed for personal gain or profit or other types of material benefits gained illegally as a consequence of the police officer's authority. Police corruption may permeate entire police departments or special units particularly where offences are repeated with the acquiescence of superiors or through on-going failure to correct them. Interestingly, there are slight variations in the definition of police corruption from country to country as countries are rightfully influenced by their own specific reality. The commonality in all definitions is the focus on inappropriate behaviour or abuse of authority for personal advantage by the police (Matsoso, 2001; Nalla and Kumar 2001; Warsame, 2001).

Da Silva (2001) noted that the Brazilian penal code distinguishes between passive and active corruption with passive corruption involving use of one's post for personal gain or to benefit someone else, and active corruption defined as offering of bribes to a police officer to persuade him/her to perform, omit, or delay an official act. Becker and Becker (2001), French (2001) and Ivkovich et al. (2001), included in their definition precise activities such as abuse of or overstepping the limits of official authority, failing to perform official duties, acceptance of bribes, kickbacks, gifts, or other benefits, protection of illegal activities, 'fixing' or destroying tickets or police records, stealing from those arrested or from crime scenes, 'planting' evidence, or cooperation with or involvement in direct criminal activities and using information gathered through the police position. Klockers et

al (2000) identified conduct known as ‘noble cause corruption’ which involves the use of morally bad or ‘dirty’ means and the misuse or abuse of authority and breach of trust in order to pursue positive or socially approved ends,. Miller (2003) included the involvement of an external party or corruptor.

Ostrov (2001) observed that, in China there is a marked distinction between large-scale corruption (involving millions of dollars) and small-scale corruption (police officers receiving free meals for example). It was observed that investigations of corruption frequently focus on small-scale rather than large-scale corruption and much of the large-scale corruption is never detected.

The corruption of police officers is a problem which spans a variety of cultures and countries; it is based on human weakness and motivations. A police officer exercises and wields a wide range of powers; inclusive of that power is a monopoly on violence in a society. Carter (1997) postulated that as there will always be people who want to take advantage of that power, the threat of corruption is inevitable. Although this may seem pessimistic it is in fact a realistic view of the problem. Therefore, any drive towards restructuring of the police service must also include the prevention of corruption. The U.S. Justice Department (1996:46) emphasised that “Corruption needs to be an integral part of any discussion on police integrity”. Inevitably, if allowed to remain unchecked corruption will eventually

undermine the objectives of any police organization. Sayed (1998), highlights how police corruption does this by distorting the fair delivery of policing services.

Contemporary Overview

The issue of police corruption has permeated most police organizations worldwide. The New York City Police Department which is the model of policing that Caribbean countries are desirous of emulating has been the source of some of the most notorious cases of police corruption. The more famous of these are the 1997 beating and sodomising of Abner Louima by several police officers and the 1999 shooting of Amadou Diallo by four undercover police officers who shot him forty-one times. Historically, in 1971 the Knapp Commission was established to investigate accusations made by Frank Serpico a police officer, against his fellow members of the New York Police Department. In their findings they stated that the major salient factor that has been the main obstacle in prosecuting corrupt officers is the fraternal understanding amongst police officers known as the code of silence and the 'Blue Curtain' under which officers regard testimony against a fellow officer as betrayal.

The police in Trinidad and Tobago have found themselves under close scrutiny as accusations of corrupt practices have been leveled against them by the media, politicians and members of the national community. Accusations have originated

from not only local sources, but have also been leveled by international watch groups such as Amnesty International and the United Nations. This interest in the alleged illegal activities of the police has become even more compelling as the nation experiences spiraling increases in its crime rates. Trinidad and Tobago has also been identified as a major transshipment point for the illegal drug trade (Figueira 2004). Figueira further speculates that the easy access the narco-trafficking traders have through these islands infers that there appears to be a symbiotic relationship between corrupt police officers and the narcotics traders.

Historically, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has recognized the pathological impact of corruption on the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and has established two commissions of enquiries which specifically examined corruption in the Police Service.

In 1986 the Commission of Enquiry into the Extent of Drug Abuse in Trinidad and Tobago popularly known as the Garvin Scott Drug Report was tabled before the country's parliament. During this period the country was experiencing the escalation of the drug trade. The report confirmed that the nation had a serious drug problem, but it was the revelations concerning the corrupt activities of a number of police officers including the then Commissioner of Police that astounded the populace.

The report stated that the Commissioner formed his personal task force called the 'Flying Squad' empowered with almost limitless authority over the entire jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago. This squad consisted of a group of "blue-eyed boys" who were a law unto themselves and had the ear of the Commissioner. The report detailed numerous illegal activities of the members of the Flying Squad including their connections to the illicit drug trade. The Commissioner himself, it was revealed, had personal ties to certain drug lords and personally ensured the safety of their operations. The report revealed that as a measure of protection for his associates in the drug trade, he disbanded the Narcotics Squad whilst turning a blind eye to the illegal activities of the Flying Squad.

The report identified the following illegal activities that were being practiced by the police: use of drugs, policing of drugs, engaging in growing and reaping marijuana, recycling of confiscated drugs for supply to drug dealers, protection rackets, smuggling, counterfeiting and murder.

The Commission recommended a virtual cleansing of the 'Augean Stables' of the Police Service. The report caused the fall of the Commissioner of Police, the disbanding of the Flying Squad and the suspension of the police officers named. They were all exonerated mainly due to the fact that although the report was

published in Parliament by the Government at the time there was not enough substantial evidence to warrant prosecution for the allegations made in the report. The only significant result was the removal of the Commissioner of Police, who was never reinstated. He retired shortly thereafter.

In 1993 the Scotland Yard Report was commissioned following allegations made by Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Rodwell Murray that there was a drug cartel within the Police Service. He made this claim following an accusation of sexual harassment made against him by a female police officer. He further claimed that the allegations against him were the work of the cartel in an attempt to get rid of him. A team of Scotland Yard detectives led by Graham Seaby was commissioned by the government to investigate his claims.

The team found that many of the common practices and norms of the Police Service were forms of corruption. This, they observed, permeated every rank and file of the Service. This cultural malady stemmed from the hierarchical system in which the service is structured. Junior officers were required to perform tasks that were not part of their function, in order to please the senior officers. Furthermore, it is a common practice for junior officers to pay personal fines to senior officers whenever they are caught committing minor illegal offences. The report also

revealed that the entire canteen system was corrupt beyond redemption with senior officers regularly removing goods from the canteen without paying.

Additionally, the report exposed the existence of cliques of corrupt senior officers who protected drug dealers by the misuse of the discipline and transfer system. There was also a core of corrupt officers who would do anything to get money for themselves regardless of the consequence to others. The report further revealed that the Police Service was divided into two fractions that competed for hegemony of the service. They protected their members and wielded extensive powers including decisions about promotions. Both fractions were implicated in many illegal activities such as providing protection for drug dealers.

Unlike the Garvin Scott Report, the Scotland Yard's report did not publish names of corrupt officers. They hoped that enough evidence could have been gathered to warrant prosecution. This however never came to fruition mainly because the Scotland Yard team was restricted from prosecuting offenders because of a lack of authority.

Rotten Apple/Barrel Theory

Until recently, law enforcement administrators viewed corruption as the moral

deficiencies of individual officers (Klockars et al., 2004; Sun, 2003; Swanson et al., 1998; Van Maanen, 1973).

The Rotten Apple Theory, which is favored by administrators, utilizes an approach that single out individuals as the perpetrators of police misconduct. It assumes the cause of police corruption as being “the moral weakness and personality defects of individual police officers,” (Stoddard, 1968). The notion of what has come to be known as the “bad apple” paradigm has often been used, especially by senior police officers, as an easy way out when they are called upon to explain corruption within their organization (Newburn, 1999:15; Kersten, 2000: 241). This theory attempted to deny the reality of the code of silence and has been subjected to severe criticism in recent years. Barker & Carter, (1994) argued that the rotten apple theory is a technique used for the “normalization of deviance” rather than as an explanation of deviant police behaviour. Labelling a deviant officer as a rogue cop or rotten apple when he or she is exposed in public is nothing but an attempt to create reasonable excuses for deviant behaviour, and the futility of this technique is even recognized by those who use it (Barker & Carter, 1994).

The bad apple idea essentially sees police corruption as a moral failure or a defect of individuals and hence it becomes an administrative problem (Klockars et al., 2000:1). However, this explanation is inadequate in terms of the reality of the organizational and occupational culture of policing in contributing to the development and continuation of corruption (Klockars et al., 2000:1; Kersten,

2000: 241). Corruption, like other behaviours, is learnt and it should be examined and remedied “within the structure and culture of police work and the police organization” (Punch, 2000: 304).

A more comprehensive approach delves beyond the bad apple and examines where it occurs, that is, the barrel is crucial. Swope (2001:1) notes that while a few bad apples may indeed get in, the real and much more serious problem is that corrupt behaviour is “nurtured in the barrel.”

However, the “rotten barrel” is a more complex concept, one difficult to address and much more problematic for the organization and senior officers. Publicity becomes focused on systemic and cultural problems which are much more difficult to deal with than the moral defects of an individual officer. Serious examination of corruption beyond the bad apples can challenge the leadership’s ability to manage the agency (Ivkovich, 2003: 297). According to Griffin and Ruiz (1994), embracing the rotten barrel theory rather than the rotten apple theory requires the acknowledgment of an inherently flawed system, which is something many departments are unprepared for and unwilling to face.

Rotten Orchard Theory

Maurice Paunch (2003) elaborated on the dynamics of the Rotten Apple/Barrel Theory by introducing the term “rotten orchard” to describe a situation in which

deviance has become systemic throughout the criminal justice system and the government. Pfaff (2010) whose research examines police corruption in three Caribbean states including Trinidad and Tobago suggested that the rotten orchard concept is synonymous with developing countries. She highlighted that these countries have weak political structures with little or no public accountability. She feels that the rotten orchard corruption is prevalent in an environment in which the government is pressured to do something about the crime problems. They emphasized achieving marketable results such as lower crime rates and increase detection. The government transfers the pressure to the police service to produce results. They both become embroiled in a symbiotic relationship with the government turning a blind eye to deviant behavior of the police as long as it helps to achieve the intended political goals. There is a compliant effort amongst all responsible to lower not merely crime, but also the fear of crime. The government exerts considerable pressure on the police and the judiciary to achieve results as swiftly as possible. Events such as unreasonable use of force and sub judiciary killings are accepted as a consequence of resolving the issue. Pfaff based her assumption for the Rotten Orchard Theory mainly on current events in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

Code of Silence Theory

The code of silence is a well-documented, informal, cultural norm that prohibits and discourages police officers from reporting the misconduct of other officers, and

tends to act as a support mechanism officers have for each other (Klockars et al., 2004; Violanti & Aron, 1995; K. Williams, 2004). Officers who witness their peers engaged in unethical behavior and violate the code of silence are often blackballed and ostracized for reporting their peers. E. Bratton (1975) asserted the most salient features of police unethical behavior and corruption are the code of silence and the likelihood of misconduct being concealed by administrators, officers, and citizens.

The Scotland Yard Report (1993) claimed that its biggest setback was the non-cooperation of the members of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. It is significant that in similar inquiries in other countries this code of silence has been most distinguishable. The Knapp (1972), Christopher (1991) and Mollen (1994) Commissions in the US, the Fitzgerald (1989) Inquiry and Wood (1997) Commission in Australia and numerous scandals in England and Wales (Morton, 1993; Newburn, 1999, p. 1), have all highlighted the importance of police culture and the code in causing and sustaining corruption. Both Skolnick (2002) and Kleinig (2001) have produced comprehensive analyses of the code of silence based upon examinations of the findings of these corruption commissions and both studies have identified the code as a normative, embedded feature of most police culture, whilst highlighting its potentially corrosive and destructive elements. Klockars et al (2000) suggested that the problem of public trust and police transparency in society has been hindered by a code of silence, which discourages officers from reporting the misconduct of their peers.

This phenomenon, the code of silence, is a well-documented aspect of the socialization of new entrants into the police culture that is theorized to be the mechanism that perpetuates unethical behavior within police agencies (Delattre, 1994). In Trinidad and Tobago prior to 2008 the training of police officers was heavily militant. A new system of training police officers which was recommended by Mastrofski was introduced in 2008. Harriot (2000) in his research into the Jamaica Constabulary Force illustrated that the para-militarism method of Caribbean policing originated from the inception of policing in the Caribbean. He indicated that policing in the Caribbean was originally established in 1865 at the behest of the plantocracy as a response to the Morant Bay Rebellion. This was a para-military force trained and equipped to put down insurrectionary movements of the country's black masses. Harriott explained that the model of policing that was exported to British colonies was based on para-militarism which he states "is a mode of organization and control of its members typified by a high degree of centralization". Researchers have suggested that police recruits on entering Police Academies generally undergo an intense period of socialization that introduces them to the culture and subculture of the police profession (Conti & Nolan, 2005). During the socialization period, new recruits are indoctrinated to believe that in order to receive assistance from other officers in response to calls for assistance, they must adhere to the code of silence or be left to face dangerous situations alone (Conti & Nolan; Delattre, 1994). The initial training in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service prior to 2008 focused on creating a bond among each group of police trainees that entered the Police Barracks to commence training. Each group was

and still is identified as “Batches”, with each individual trainee referring to their fellow trainees by the sobriquet “Batch”. This sobriquet is accepted throughout an officer’s career as a special acceptance code that demonstrates not only the bond but also as a password that provides certain privileges such as code of silence.

Researchers also have observed that during their stay at the police training academy such as the TTPS Police Academy, police recruits are totally institutionalized and cut off from the wider society (Goffman, 1961).

During the officers (TTPS) training and probationary period, which lasted a year or longer prior to 2008, police recruits underwent a period described by Goffman (1961) as “mortification of self” (p. 14). During this re-socialization period, the views and behavioral patterns of the individual officers are stripped away and officers are encouraged to sever relationships with family members and friends of questionable character, or risk being terminated. The ‘Batch’ (a term used by TTPS officers to describe their fellow officers they trained with) becomes the family of the recruit. During this period of intense training, the officer is stripped of his or her previous support system and learns to accept the ‘Batch’ as his family and support. This initiation lays the foundation for the sense of isolation from the public and the group cohesiveness that is often experienced by police officers. Recruits believe that their safety depends on the assistance and cooperation of their fellow officers; thus engendering a sense of loyalty that develops into an “esprit de corps”. This loyalty according to Pfaff (2010) is cultivated as part of the socialization

problem and this process becomes embedded in the individual's psyche. When an officer enters the academy he is immediately exposed to the culture of the police organization. He develops bonds with fellow trainees - his 'Batches' - as they share experiences and undergo similar developmental processes. He learns that the public is not to be trusted and he has his first encounter with police management, always from a position of lowliness often at the expense of his pride (Pfaff 2010). The TTPS is still hierarchical in structure, and divided into two distinct divisions with senior officers in the first division and junior officers in the second division. The individual is socialized along with fellow recruits and they begin to form the same perspective on policing and on their particular role. Pfaff declares that police recruits learn from both training and their experience during training, that protecting a fellow officer is the first rule of the job. While this paradigm initially applies to the protection of life and limb it begins to gradually and naturally extend to other interactions between officers. This sense of loyalty is reinforced throughout an officer's career (Skolnick 2002). Eventually the process develops to the point where protecting a fellow officer by committing perjury, an offence for which an officer will lose his job if discovered, exemplifies one's loyalty to the group (Kappeler et al 1994).

Young recruits into law enforcement still developing morally and possessing a naïve view of police work, may not be fully prepared for the psychological and emotional rigors of policing and can become pliable and easily influenced. Barker and Carter (1994) described the socialization process of police in four steps. First,

individual police officers share an important activity (police duty); second, based on that activity they develop a continuing interaction (clannishness); third, the degree of officers' proximity to this interaction determines their group identity (police solidarity); lastly, they create and share values and informal norms with a special jargon. Police subculture develops through this socialization process in most police organizations (Barker & Carter, 1994).

Sutherland (1939) was one of the first to observe that groups may exhibit normative conflict reflected in cultural patterns favouring criminal behaviour existing alongside patterns unfavourable to crime. Sutherland theorized that criminal behaviour is learned in interaction with others in a process of communication. Sutherland noted many persons employed in a business enterprise and in political positions routinely engaged in job related noncriminal and criminal activity known as occupational deviance during the course of their work and that the crimes committed by these professionals were possible because of the nature of their work (Alpert et al., 1998, p. 22).

The police service is closed to outsiders except at entry level. It is self governing with respect to personnel policies, led by officers who come from within the organization, emphasizes conformity, and plans employee careers well into the future (Mosher, 1982). When these qualities are paired with dangerous and highly scrutinized missions, a police agency typically perpetuates a loyalty to fellow officers and a masculine pride (Hubert et al., 2003; Skolnick, 2002; Skolnick and

Fyfe, 1993) that could be disrupted in the absence of a code of silence. According to Crank (1998, p. 224), silence as a form of secrecy ultimately “protects line officers from oversight [and] it insulates them from the citizens who will not understand police situational use of violence, treatment of criminals, and frequent violation of procedural guidelines”. To perform effectively and efficiently many police officers also believe that silence is essential - to catch a criminal, solve a case, resolve a dispute, or act quickly to take control of a threatening situation, officers cannot “rat” on each other every time a rule or procedure is compromised.

Sociology has significantly contributed to understanding deviance from an organizational and group approach with two fundamental notions. First, persistent deviance thrives most when it receives collective support. Second, deviance is not the innovation of a group or individual, but has a history in some environments (Matza, as cited in Barker & Carter, 1994). These two factors—group support for deviant conduct and long histories of deviant and corrupt practices can be found in many police departments (Barker & Carter, 1994).

Whilst there remains the complexity as to the cause for misconduct an equally engaging phenomenon is why police officers do not typically report fellow officers’ unethical behavior. They abide by the code that exemplifies police subculture and foster an environment in which corruption is facilitated. According to Pfaff (2009) the code is distinct in its characteristic including the lack of reporting deviant behavior. Research conducted by Johnson and Cox (2005) concluded that a failure

to report a deviant act may occur if the officer perceived a mismatch between the crime committed by his colleague and the punishment. If he feels that his colleague will be punished too harshly or unnecessarily, that officer is less likely to report the deviance. Officers bounded by the code fail to report deviant colleagues. Westmorland (2005) believes that the context in which the deviance occur may strongly influence an officer's decision. Westmorland (2005) in his research provided officers with scenarios exhibiting police misconduct; many officers said they needed more contexts surrounding the incident in order to properly evaluate the level of the wrong doing. The same study revealed the existence of the belief that if an officer engages in corruption out of character due to some life crisis he may not be held accountable by other officers due to the mitigating circumstances. However if the corruption was done strictly for financial gain ninety percent of the respondents believed that the officer should be dismissed. Hunter (1999) added that police officers sometimes engage in, or fail to report, the unethical behavior of their peers out of fear of reprisal.

O'Malley (1997) contended that police organizations that condone the code of silence send an unspoken message that they value "loyalty over integrity" (p. 21). Kutnjak Ivkovich (2005) added that within the law enforcement culture, there are no incentives to report one's own unethical behavior or that of fellow officers' and risk job loss or prosecution. This being true, officers are likely to share and support the code of silence and "have no motivation to report fellow officers' misconduct that is protected by the code, even if they are guaranteed confidentiality or

anonymity” (p. 45). This does not account for, or explain why some officers engage in police misconduct.

Noble Cause Corruption

Steinberg and Austern (1990) contended that some officers rationalize that unethical behavior is a part of their jobs; the perception is that the legal system does not adequately punish criminals in society. Some officers feel they are justified when they administer *noble cause* justice. Whether this indeed refers to behaviour that occurs with “noble” intentions or is merely used as a rationalization for unethical, illegal or corrupt behaviour is debatable

The idea of noble cause has been used to explain at least some activities that most would consider corrupt. In an examination of most acts of corruption, the behaviour is deemed to have a benefit of some form for the individual or individuals involved. Punch (2000:305) defines noble cause corruption as “using illicit means for organizationally and socially approved ends.” Similarly, Grabowsky and Larmour (2000: 1) define it as “the abuse of power for institutional ends, where there is no explicit personal gain for the offender.”

For example, an indicator of this is found in a study of over 900 police officers, in which 3.8 per cent strongly agreed and 39.1 per cent agreed that “always following the rules is not compatible with getting the job done” (Weisburd, 2000: 2). O’Connor (2000:92) describes an aspect of police culture where some officers view themselves as “noble individuals who represent a thin blue line of virtue positioned against the evil forces in society”.

Noble cause corruption can take many forms but is generally based on the notion that the ends justify the means and includes actions such as false testimony, planting evidence, excessive force, illegal surveillance and racial profiling (Kleinig, 2002). However, the idea of crossing the line of integrity for the greater good has emphatically not been accepted. The ends do not justify the means, no matter how well intentioned (Harrison, 1999).

Harrison states the problem most succinctly:

...does an officer have the duty to infringe on an individual’s liberty for a laudable outcome? Should society excuse police officers for breaking fundamental laws, not for personal gain but to serve a greater moral imperative?

The answer must always be an emphatic “no”.

Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator

Klockars et al (2004) postulated that measuring unethical behaviour is a difficult task for researchers. He and his colleagues measured the levels of integrity of individual police officers within the organisation instead of measuring the levels of corruption within the police organisation. They in turn used the aggregate measure of individual officers' integrity as a reflection of the organisations integrity. Klockars work pioneered empirical research in unethical police behaviour. Klockars focused on levels of integrity as an explanation for unethical behaviour. His team defined police integrity as "the normative inclination among police to resist temptation to abuse the rights and privilege of their occupation" (Klockars et al., 2004, p.9). The researchers constructed their survey instrument to measure the levels of intolerance of misconduct by individual officers within police organisation.

Klockars et al (2004) in their study collected a sample by surveying 3235 police officers from 30 United States police organizations using a non-random, convenience sample. Each officer was given eleven hypothetical case scenarios and asked to evaluate each scenario by providing responses to questions in reference to each scenario. The result of the survey revealed that officers perceived some forms of misconduct to be more serious than others. The more serious the misconduct was perceived to be the more willing the officer was to report a fellow officer. The majority of officers said they would not report a colleague for less serious misconduct such as accepting gratuities, operating an off duty security company or involvement in an accident while under the influence of alcohol. They

however indicated that they would report a fellow officer who stole money, accepted kick backs, or used excessive force (Klockars et al 2000).

Furthermore, a measure of corruption was obtained by asking officers “How serious do you consider this behaviour to be?” Answers which were provided on a five point Likert type scale (1 = not serious, to 5 = serious) were used as an indirect measure of the officers’ moral principles. Officers with higher moral principles perceive corrupt behaviours to be more serious than officers with lower moral principles. Klockar et al (2000) suggest that an officer’s willingness to report misconduct is influenced by the officer’s attitude towards misconduct, and more significantly, the nature of the misconduct.

Additionally, Klockars and his team evaluated the strength of the code of silence that exists among police officers by utilizing the same corruption scenarios designed to adjudicate integrity. They however asked the question ‘Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?’ A Likert scale (one = definitely not, to 5 =definitely yes) was utilised to evaluate the concept. A low score meant a greater affirmation to the code of silence, whilst a high score denotes a lack of support for the code of silence.

In the analysis of their study, the researchers revealed that while police organisations vary regarding a culture of integrity, the findings identified the existence of a police subculture that encourages the ‘code of silence’. Klockner et al (2004) also found evidence that suggested there is a tolerance among police officers for at least some form of unethical behaviour.

Kutnjah et al (2004) conducted a similar research of police officers in Croatia. Their findings supported Klockner et al in that regardless of the extent of their knowledge of and practical experience in policing, all groups of respondents perceived the described cases of police corruption to vary greatly in terms of their seriousness. Ivkovic (2004) completed a similar research utilizing Klockner’s scenarios when he examined citizen and police evaluations of the seriousness of police misconduct in the United States and Croatia. The results of Ivkovic’s study indicated that while the exact evaluation of each scenario differ slightly, their relative rankings match closely across both respondent groups and across the two separate societies involved (Ivkovic, 2004). Ivkovic’s research alludes to the idea of a shared hierarchy of crime seriousness that transcends national boundaries and suggests a common understanding of the issues at hand.

Westmarland (2005) in his study of police integrity used Klockner et al (2000) integrity survey’s eleven hypothetical case scenarios. He refined and elaborated Klockner’s perception of integrity survey by further combining the scenarios into

three major categories of corruption. Klockars et al (2000) in the original form of the survey, divided the scenarios into three categories of levels of seriousness. Westmarland further re-classified the three categories into areas of corruption. The first category he classed as internal and administrative infringement, which he described as “rule bending”. The second category is those scenarios that are classed as “noble cause corruption” in which officers apparently do not have a financial motive. The third category includes acquisitive crimes involving money or goods. Westmarland’s research and the three survey categories of Administrative, Noble Cause and Criminal offered a new dimension and provided clarity to the Integrity survey in the research of police corruption.

Organizational Commitment

Bateman and Strasser (1984) defines organizational commitment as “ multi-dimensional in nature, involving an employee’s loyalty to the organization, willingness to exert effort on behalf of the organization, degree of good and value congruency with the organization and desire to maintain membership” (p.95). Porter et al (1974) in their research of organizational commitment identified three necessary ingredients that comprises the concept “a strong belief in and acceptance of the organization’s goals, a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization and a definite desire to maintain organizational membership”.

A number of studies including Perry (1997) and Meyer and Allen (1997) have found that government employees such as police officers have higher levels of continuance commitment than other job sectors. Public sector employees such as police officers have high levels of commitment to the organization and its goals because it is viewed that they are a different type of employee, with strong ethics as well as job security (Perry, 1997).

Mowday et al (1979) developed the Organizational Commitment Survey as a measure for organizational commitment. Their survey has proven to be a highly reliable measure of organizational commitment with a Cronbach's alpha range between .82 and .93. The effectiveness of the survey was supported by Atak (2009) in his research into the Turkish National Police.

Curbing Police Corruption

The need for vigilance and pro-active measures against police corruption are paramount in resolving the issue of police corruption. Initiatives such as screening police applicants thoroughly and implementing laws that remove corrupt officers from their positions before their corrupt behaviour spreads were suggested by Brief & Weiss (2000) as necessary in all police organizations. They also further suggested that more importantly it must be recognised that emotions play an influential role in one's decisions and attitude which shapes behaviours in the workplace. Hoffman (1983) suggested that understanding how police officers

regulate their own emotions and begin their descent into unethical behaviour and thinking is an important step towards understanding ways to combat police misconduct and corruption. Prenzler & Mackay (1995) suggested that one grey area which can lead to expectations about behaviour and which Ivkovich (2005) consider to be the stepping stone of corruption is the acceptance of gratuities. Prenzler and Mackay believe that many officers feel that gratuities are an acceptable part of the job and not necessarily corrupt.

Ivkovich (2005) proposed the slippery slope perspective which states that police officers begin their descent into corrupt behaviour by accepting small gifts and gratuities, after which they begin a gradual and often insidious moral decline. Brief & Weiss (2000) presented a similar assumption suggesting that corruption is based on a continuum with the acceptance of small gifts as the beginning of the continuum where with one small act the officer begins the journey and continues along the line to fully fledged corruption. Both studies proposed that such action should be nipped in the bud. There must be distinct clarity of penalty on small offences such as the acceptances of gifts and gratuities and the consequences of such acts.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The purpose of this study is to examine what police officers of the TTPS perceive their levels integrity to be. Measuring their integrity would indicate how corrupt the officers of the organization perceived themselves to be. Also, this study examines officers' perception of their allegiance to the code of silence with regards to not reporting wrong doings committed by their fellow officers. This is in order to comprehend the magnitude of the influence of the construct 'code of silence' among officers in the TTPS on their levels of integrity. This study also focuses on how organizational commitment of members of the TTPS is influenced by their perception of their levels of integrity and their perception of their code of silence.

The following research questions were elicited for the study

1. What are the officers of the TTPS perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with any corrupt act?

2. What are the officers of the TTPS perception of their code of silence when confronted with a corrupt act?
3. Is there any relationship between officers' perception of their code of silence and their perception of their levels of integrity?
4. If there is a relationship between officers' perception of their code of silence and their perception of their levels of integrity what category of corruption (administrative, noble cause or criminal) is most influential in the relationship?
5. Do officers' perceptions of their integrity influence their levels of organizational commitment?
6. Do officers' perceptions of the code of silence in the TTPS influence their levels of organizational commitment?

The hypotheses deducted from the research questions are as follows:-

1. (Ho): There are no decreases in officers' perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

(H1): There are decreases in officers' perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

2. (Ho): There are no increases in officers' perception of their levels of code of silence when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

(H1): There are increases in officers' perception of their levels of code of silence when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

3. Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perceptions of their levels of integrity and their levels of code of silence.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perceptions of their levels of integrity and their levels of code of silence.

4. (Ho): The noble cause category of corruption does not influence the relationship between police officers' integrity and code of silence.

(H1): The noble cause category of corruption does influence the relationship between police officer's integrity and code of silence.

5. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perceptions of their levels of integrity and their commitment to the organization.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perceptions of their levels of integrity and their commitment to the organization.

6. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perceptions of their code of silence and their commitment to the organization.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perceptions of their code of silence and their commitment to the organization.

Definition of Terms

Batch: A colloquial term used by officers of the TTPS to describe fellow officers they underwent induction training with. The term is also used throughout the organization by officers to informally address one another.

Code of Silence: An unwritten rule and custom among police officers that they will neither testify against a fellow officer nor report a fellow officer engaged in corrupt acts. Officers are expected to help in any cover-up of illegal actions.

Excessive Force: Refers to the use of physical force that is beyond what is necessary to make a lawful intervention.

Noble Cause Corruption: A mind set or subculture among police officers that fosters a belief that the ends justify the means. Police officers' mission is to make their country safe, their commitment to this mission leads to the belief that the infringement of constitutional rights or violating laws in order to accomplish their mission is justified. Officers who adopt this philosophy suppress moral and integrity compasses.

Police Integrity: The normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation (Klockars, et al., 2004, p.2).

TTPS: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

Chapter Three

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to investigate perceptions of levels of integrity held by police officers of the TTPS in order to assess the levels of corruption that exist in the organization. Corruption being the reverse of integrity, a lack of integrity alludes to a penchant for corruption. Additionally, this research examines the perception officers have of the levels of the code of silence that exist in the TTPS. Correlation investigations are also conducted to reveal the relationship between the officers' perception of their integrity and their code of silence, and whether these concepts are related to officers' organizational commitment.

Population Sample

The research sample population consisted of police officers of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. The Service is the sole provider of law enforcement on the twin island republic in the Caribbean. The Service is divided into nine main

divisions which are based on the geography of the country. They are Port of Spain (the capital city), Western, North Eastern, Northern, Eastern, Tobago, Central, Southern and South Western. There are also a number of specialised sections and branches that completes the structure of the Service such as the Special Branch, the Guard and Emergency Branch, the Inter Agency Task Force and the Homicide Bureau.

The service is structured along a hierarchical line with an executive leadership that includes the Commissioner of Police, three Deputy Commissioners and eight Assistant Commissioners. Divisions and Branches are led by a Senior Superintendent who reports to the executive. The Service is governed by the constitution of the country, the Police Service Act and the Police Service Regulations 2007. These laws provide the rules and regulation for the entire Service. The divisions themselves are very homogeneous in personnel; it is customary for officers to be transferred from one division to another and into one of the specialised sections. There is no differentiation in personnel; each section is governed by the same rules and regulations. The organisation itself is hermetically sealed from outside influence to its values and culture. Similar to other police organisations worldwide, the TTPS has its own jargon; meanings are understood throughout the organization. Words such as ‘batch’ and ‘stooge’ have distinct implications that are only truly appreciated by members of the organisation.

The Service has a sanctioned strength of seven thousand seven hundred and fifteen officers. There is however a shortfall of officers on active duty by approximately eighteen hundred officers. This number is consistently in a flux with a high attrition rate and officers on vacation leave, study leave and sick leave constantly affect the actual strength of the Service.

The researcher submitted an application seeking permission to conduct the research to the Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Community Relation in the Police Service. (Appendix B) Approval was granted on the condition that confidentiality is observed. (Appendix C) From the list of divisions the following were randomly drawn and selected to participate in the research - Tobago, Port of Spain, Southern, Northern, Western along with the Inter Agency Task Force and the Guard and Emergency Branch as representatives of sections and branches.

The survey was personally conducted by the researcher with the assistance of the station commanders. Questionnaires were hand delivered in unmarked envelopes to the commanders of the relevant divisional stations and section for distribution to the officers. They were requested to complete the questionnaire and return them sealed in the envelope. A forty-minute period was given to complete the questionnaire after which they were collected by the researcher. Two hundred and eighty questionnaires were issued with one hundred and fifty- five returned completed. This number was further reduced to one hundred and fifty-two as three

questionnaires were eliminated. The three questionnaires eliminated were those of three respondents who indicated that they did not answer the questions honestly.

(Demographic section of questionnaire)

Sample Characteristics

The data in Table 1 display the total number of respondents that comprise the sample of the study. Of the total of 152 respondents, 120 are males and 32 are females.

Table 1: *Total sample population and gender scaled by frequency and percentile*

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Valid Male	120	78.9
Female	32	21.1
Total	152	100.0

The data in Table 2 show the frequency of the ages of the sample population which was divided into six age categories. There are eight officers in the 20 to 25 age group, twenty-five in the 26 to 30 age group, forty-two in the 31 to 35 age group, twenty-nine in the 36 to 40 age group, twenty-eight in the 41 to 45 age group and twenty officers in the 46 and older age group.

Table 2: *Age frequency and percentile of sample population*

TTPS Age Categories of Respondents		Frequency	Percent
Valid	20 to 25 years	8	5.3
	26 to 30 years	25	16.4
	31 to 35 years	42	27.6
	36 to 40 years	29	19.1
	41 to 45 years	28	18.4
	46 years and older	20	13.2
	Total	152	100.0

Table 3 below depicts the length of service of the officers in the TTPS who comprise the sample population. There are forty-eight officers with 1 to 9 years' service, fifty officers with tenure between 10 to 14 years, eighteen officers between 15 to 19 years' service, twenty-two officers with 20 to 24 years' service and fourteen officers with 25 years and over service.

Table 3: *Frequency and percentile of sample population length of service in TTPS*

Years of Service in TTPS		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1 to 9 years service	48	31.6
	10 to 14 years service	50	32.9
	15 to 19 years service	18	11.8
	20 to 24 years service	22	14.5
	25 years service and over	14	9.2
	Total	152	100.0

The minimum educational requirement to enlist in the TTPS is five Ordinary level passes or CXC passes which is the equivalent of a high school/secondary school diploma. The data in table 4 illustrate the levels of education of the sample population. There are 113 respondents with secondary school as their highest levels of education, 33 respondents with associate degrees and 6 respondents with bachelor's degrees.

Table 4: *Frequency and percentile of levels of education of sample*

Education Level	Frequency	Percent
Valid Secondary	113	74.3
Associate Degree	33	21.7
BachelorsDegree	6	3.9
Total	152	100.0

The data in Table 5 is a cross tabulation of gender and levels of education. Of the male respondents, secondary school is the highest level of education for 91 of them, 24 have obtained associate degrees and 5 have undergraduate (bachelors) degrees. The female population includes 22 with secondary education as their highest level, 9 with associate degrees and 1 with undergraduate (bachelors) degree.

Table 5: *Cross tabulation of sample population levels of education and gender.*

Gender	Highest Level of Education			Total
	Secondary	Associate Degree	Bachelors Degree	
Male	91	24	5	120
Female	22	9	1	32
Total	113	33	6	152

The members of the TTPS are divided into two groups - the first and second divisions. Both groups are hierarchical in structure. The first division includes the

Executive and other managers. The second division is the work force of the organization and comprises the following ranks - constables, corporals, sergeants and inspectors. The data in Table 6 show the ranks of the population sampled. There are 106 constables, 29 corporals, 13 sergeants and 4 inspectors.

Table 6: *Frequency and percentile of sample population rank.*

Rank		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Constable	106	69.7
	Corporal	29	19.1
	Sergeant	13	8.6
	Inspector	4	2.6
	Total	152	100.0

The data in Table 7 show a cross tabulation of gender and rank of the respondents. The sample consists of 85 male and 21 female constables, 23 male and 6 female corporals, 8 males and 5 female sergeants and 4 male inspectors.

Table 7: *Cross tabulation of sample population gender and rank.*

Gender	What is your rank?				Total
	Constable	Corporal	Sergeant	Inspector	
Male	85	23	8	4	120
Female	21	6	5	0	32
Total	106	29	13	4	152

The data of Table 8 show the different assignments of the sample population. There are 17 station/clerical officers, 16 uniform patrol officers, 106 task force/operations officers and 13 special assignment officers such as detectives and finger print experts. It should be noted that task force officers are uniform officers who are assigned to teams within the stations and divisions for the purpose of reducing the occurrences of crime and criminal activities. Operations officers are similarly uniform officers with the same purpose, but who are assigned to specific sections in the police service such as the Inter Agency Task Force.

Table 8: *Frequency and percentile of sample population assignment.*

Respondents Assignments	Frequency	Percent
Valid Station/Clerical Officer	17	11.2
Uniform Patrol Officer	16	10.5
Task Force/Operations Officer	106	69.7
Special Assignment	13	8.6
Total	152	100.0

The data at Table 9 show a cross tabulation of gender and assignment of the sample population. There are 8 male and 9 female station/clerical officers, 12 male and 4 female uniform patrol officers, 94 male and 12 female task force/operations officers and 6 male and 7 female special assignment officers.

Table 9: *Cross tabulation of gender and assignment of the sample population*

Gender	What is your assignment				Total
	Station/ Clerical Officer	Uniform Patrol Officer	Task Force/ Operations Officer	Special Assignment	
Male	8	12	94	6	120
Female	9	4	12	7	32
Total	17	16	106	13	152

Test Materials

The purpose of this research is to investigate perceptions of levels of integrity held by police officers of the TTPS in order to comprehend the levels of corruption that exist in the organization. Corruption being the reverse of integrity, a lack of integrity alludes to a penchant for corruption. Additionally, this research examines the perception officers have of the levels of the code of silence that exist in the TTPS. Correlation investigations are also conducted to reveal the relationship between the officers' perception of their integrity and their code of silence, and whether these concepts are related to officers' organizational commitment.

The questionnaire utilised in this study has three sections: 1. Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator, 2. Steers and Mowdays Organizational Commitment, and 3. Demographics. The survey has thirty-nine questions and requires approximately twenty minutes to be completed. (Appendix A)

The questionnaire was received by the respondents in an envelope. The content of the questionnaire includes a cover letter to the respondent requesting the assistance of police officers as respondents to the attached questionnaire. The letter also guaranteed anonymity of the respondent and the use of the information obtained restricted to this study. A brief description of the study and instructions on completing the questionnaires was also provided in the letter. (Appendix A)

The Perception of Police Integrity Indicator

The Perception of Police Integrity questionnaire which was created by Kloakars and Associates was the main questionnaire utilised to examine the respondents' perception of their integrity and code of silence levels in this research. Apart from the United States the questionnaire has also been used in countries such as Croatia, Poland, Slovenia (Ivkovich et al 2000), Japan (Johnson 2003) and Turkey (Kucukuysal 2008). The questionnaire highlights eleven scenarios of corrupt behaviour of police officers. The scenarios are listed below together with the infringement of the rules and regulations of the police service as stated in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Regulations 2007. Commission of these offences can result on conviction to dismissal from the police service. Many of the offences however are criminal acts which are direct contraventions of the laws governing the country hence officers who commit these offences can be prosecuted internally by the police service and externally in a court of law.

CASE 1

A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Section 133 (b). An officer shall not without the consent of the Commissioner, accepts any paid employment or engage in any trade or any professional,

commercial, agricultural or industrial undertaking, or undertake private work for remuneration, whether in or outside of Trinidad and Tobago;

CASE 2

A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

Section 146. Except with the written permission of the Commissioner, an officer shall not accept a gift or reward from a member of the public or an organisation.

CASE 3

A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a ticket.

Section 150. (g) Corrupt practice, that is to say, if an officer-

(ii) Directly or indirectly solicits any gratuity, gifts or reward, subscription or testimonial without the consent of the Commissioner;

CASE 4

A police officer is widely liked in the community and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.

Section 146. Except with the written permission of the Commissioner, an officer shall not accept a gift or reward from a member of the public or an organisation.

CASE 5

A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewellery shop. The display cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch worth about 2 days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch has been stolen during the burglary.

Section 150. (g) Corrupt practice, that is to say, if an officer-

(i) Fails to account for or to make a prompt and correct return of any money or property received by him in his official capacity;

CASE 6

A police officer has a local arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Section 150. (g) Corrupt practice, that is to say, if an officer-

(iv) improperly uses his position as an officer for his private advantage;

CASE 7

A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. His supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune up the supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the supervisor's behaviour.

Section 150. (g) Corrupt practice, that is to say, if an officer-

(iv) improperly uses his position as an officer for his private advantage;

CASE 8

At 2:00 a.m. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting the accident and, he transports the driver to his home.

150 (2)(d) Neglect of duty, that is to say, if an officer-

(vi) fails to report anything which he knows is his duty to report;

CASE 9

A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Section 150. (2)(g) Corrupt practice, that is to say, if an officer-

(ii) directly or indirectly solicits any gratuity, gifts or reward, subscription or testimonial without the consent of the Commissioner;

Section 150. (2) (m) Drinking on duty or soliciting drink, that is to say, if an officer-

(i) Demands or endeavours to persuade any other person to give him...any intoxicating liquor while he is on duty;

CASE 10

Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting

Section 150. (2) (h) Unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority, that is to say, if an officer-

(ii) Uses unnecessary violence to a prisoner or other person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty;

CASE 11

A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property but keeps the money for himself.

Section 150. (g) Corrupt practice, that is to say, if an officer-

(i) Fails to account for or to make a prompt and correct return of any money or property received by him in his official capacity ;

Unlike Pfaff (2010) whose research into corruption in Trinidad and Tobago utilised one direct question 'How corrupt is the organization?' to gauge the level of corruption in the police service, this research utilised the eleven scenarios of Klockars; each scenario with two distinct questions. The first question the respondents are asked is "How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?" This question establishes the respondent's perception of his or her personal levels

of integrity. A five point Likert type measurement of 1 being 'not at all serious' to 5 being 'very serious' was used to obtain a numerical score on each scenario.

Kloakars (2000) and Kucukuysal (2008) used the same scenarios and this very question in their research into police corruption. This study however differs to Kucukuysal's (2008) work in that another question 'Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this type of behaviour?' was asked. Similarly a five point Likert type scale is used to answer this question with 1 being definitely not and 5 definitely yes. This is in keeping with the work of Kloakers (2000) who in a study similar to this utilised the question to investigate the strength of the bond between police officers as theorised in the Code of Silence Theory. A Cronbach's Alpha analysis was conducted on the questions of the Perception of Police Integrity Survey. A Cronbach's alpha value of .92 was observed. This measure has a high reliability status.

Westmarland's (2005) categorization of Klockars police corruption scenarios provided greater refining of, and a new dimension to the scenarios. He categorised the following scenarios as administrative corruption, Case 1 (an officer operates private business when off duty), Case 2 (officer accepts free meals, discount on beat), Case 4 (officer accepts holiday gifts from merchants), Case 7 (officer fix supervisor's car for holiday), and Case 9 (officer accepts drinks to ignore late bar closing). He termed Case 8 (officer aids drunken police officer) and Case 10 (officer uses excessive force) as noble cause corruption. Whilst Case

3 (officer accepts bribe from speeding motorist), Case 5 (officer stole watch from crime scene), Case 6 (officer accepts auto shop kick backs), and Case 11 (officer theft from found wallet) were categorised as criminal corruption.

Organizational Commitment Survey

Organizational commitment was measured by the OCS (Mowday et al, 1979). It is a well-known, reliable instrument with a Cronbach's alpha range between .82 and .93 (Mowday et al, 1979). The eight item questionnaire used a 7-point Likert-type scale, the statistical codes were 1 = strongly disagree progressing along a continuum to 7= strongly agree. Examples of the questions are as follows: I am willing to put a great deal of effort beyond what is normally expected in order to help this organization be successful. This organization really inspires my best job performance. I feel very little loyalty to this organization.

Analysis Techniques

The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) was utilised to analyse the research data collected. The analysis of the Klockars (2000) Perception of Integrity

Indicator scenarios required exploration of descriptive statistics to analyze integrity, with the mean score of each scenario being the significant result. The maximum mean score for the questions to each scenario is calculated out of a perfect score of 5.00 which is scaled as 'very serious' on the questionnaire. The achievement of such a score indicates that the respondents have an untainted level of integrity, however the further the mean score regresses from 5.00 the lower the respondents' integrity levels. Klockars used in his research the score of 3.00 which is the equivalent of 'not sure' on the questionnaire as a bench mark for an unacceptable level of integrity. Scores of less than 3.00 indicates the lowering of the respondents' integrity, while scores above 3.00 indicates a rise in the respondents' integrity. The scores are based therefore on the respondents' specific perception which is relative to the particular case scenario.

Similarly, descriptive statistics were utilised to analyze officers' perception of their code of silence; the mean score also being the significant result. The maximum mean score for each question is calculated out of a perfect score of 5.00 which is scaled as 'definitely yes' on the questionnaire. The achievement of such a score indicates that the respondent does not adhere to the code of silence that exists among his fellow officers. Klockars uses in his research the score of 3.00 which is the equivalent of 'not sure' on the questionnaire as a bench mark to differentiate between increasing or decreasing in adherence to the code of silence. The lower the mean score indicates a greater loyalty to the code of silence.

Pearsons r was mainly used to analyse whether a correlation exists between the following variables:

- The Perception of Integrity;
- Organizational Commitment;
- The Code of Silence.

It is important to note that whilst correlation investigations can identify relationships of construct and the directions of these relationships it cannot define causality (Bastick & Matalon, 2007).

Chapter Four

The purpose of this research is to investigate perceptions of levels of integrity held by police officers of the TTPS in order to assess the levels of corruption that exist

in the organization. Corruption being the reverse of integrity, a lack of integrity alludes to a penchant for corruption. Additionally, this research examines the perception officers have of the levels of the code of silence that exist in the TTPS. Correlation investigations are also conducted to reveal the relationship between the officers' perception of their integrity and their code of silence, and whether these concepts are related to officers' organizational commitment.

A survey was conducted in the TTPS with a sample population of one hundred and fifty-two officers in different sections of the organization. The questionnaire utilised consisted of the Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator, the Organizational Commitment Survey and a Demographic questionnaire. The data gathered was analysed using the SPSS programme. The results are presented in order of the hypotheses under investigation, and are followed by an analysis as it pertains to the hypotheses. The following are the hypotheses being examined:

1. (Ho): There are no decreases in officers' perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

(H1): There are decreases in officers' perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

2. (Ho): There are no increases in officers' perception of their levels of code of silence when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

(H1): There are increases in officers' perception of their levels of code of silence when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

3. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their levels of code of silence.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their levels of code of silence.

4. (Ho): The noble cause category of corruption does not influence the relationship between police officers' integrity and code of silence.

(H1): The noble cause category of corruption does influence the relationship between officer's integrity and code of silence.

5. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their commitment to the organization.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their commitment to the organization.

6. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perception of their code of silence and their commitment to the organization.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perception of their code of silence and their commitment to the organization.

Results

Levels of Integrity

In order to establish officers' perception of their levels of integrity, this research utilised Klockars (2000) Perception of Integrity Indicator which consisted of eleven scenarios of corrupt practices. Respondents were required to give their opinion of how serious they consider each offence to be.

The data presented in Table 10 show the mean scores in descending order of respondents' views of how serious they consider the corrupt offences in the eleven case scenarios of Klockars (2000) Perception of Integrity Indicator to be. The mean scores of respondents are utilised to elicit their levels of integrity bearing in mind that lower mean scores allude to an acceptance of police corruption. The scenario least considered by respondents in levels of seriousness was Case 1 (an officer who

operates his own private business when off duty) with a mean score of 1.89 out of a maximum 5.00. Case 1 is the only scenario in which the mean score of TTPS officers is below the acceptable level of 3.00. In all the other case scenarios the mean scores obtained are above the acceptable level of mean score 3.00. The scenario with the second lowest mean score is Case 10 (officer use excessive force) which has a mean score of 3.09. The third lowest mean score is case 8 (officer aid drunken police officer) with a mean score of 3.24. The forth is Case 4 (officer accepts holiday gifts from merchants) with a mean score of 3.38. The fifth is Case 2 (officer accepts free meals, discount on beat) with a mean score of 3.57. The sixth is Case 6 (officer accepts auto shop kick backs) with a mean score of 3.87. The seventh is Case 7 (officer fix supervisor's car for holiday) with a mean score of 4.11. The eighth is Case 9 (officer accepts drinks to ignore late bar closing) with a mean score of 4.44. The ninth is Case 11 (officer theft from found wallet) with a mean score of 4.59. The tenth is Case 3 (officer accepts bribe from speeding motorist) with a mean score of 4.81. The eleventh and the scenario considered the most serious offence is Case 5 (officer stole watch from crime scene) with a mean score of 4.87.

Table 10: *Mean score of respondents' levels of seriousness of the scenarios of the Integrity Perception Indicator.*

Own View of Seriousness	N	Mean
(Case1) Officer owns private business.	152	1.89
(Case 10) Officer uses excessive force.	152	3.09
(Case 8) Officer aids drunken police officer.	152	3.24
(Case 4) Officer accepts holiday gifts from merchants.	152	3.38
(Case 2) Officer accepts free meals, discounts on beat.	152	3.57
(Case 6) Officer accepts auto repair shop kickbacks	152	3.87
(Case 7) Officer fixes supervisor's car for holiday.	152	4.11
(Case 9) Officer accepts drinks to ignore late bar closing.	152	4.44
(Case 11) Officer theft from found wallet.	152	4.59
(Case 3) Officer accepts bribe from speeding motorist.	152	4.81
(Case 5) Officer steals watch from crime scene.	152	4.87
Valid N (list wise)	152	

Levels of Code of Silence

In order to establish how loyal, the officers of the TTPS are to the code of silence that exists in the organization, this research utilised Klockars (2000) Perception of Integrity Indicator which consisted of eleven scenarios of corrupt practices. Respondents were required to give their opinion of how willing are they to report a fellow police officer who commits the offence in each scenario. Klockars utilized this question to ascertain the levels of code of silence in police organizations.

The data presented in Table 11 show the mean scores in descending order of respondents' willingness to report a fellow police officer who commits the offences in the eleven case scenarios of Klockars (2000) Perception of Integrity Indicator. Five case scenarios were rated by officers of the TTPS below the acceptable mean score of 3.00. The case scenario for which respondents will least likely report a fellow police officer is Case 1 (an officer who operates his own private business when off duty) with a mean score of 1.49 out of a maximum 5.00. The scenario with the second lowest mean score is Case 10 (officer uses excessive force) which has a mean score of 2.47. The third lowest mean score is case 8 (officer aids drunken police officer) with a mean score of 2.54. The fourth is Case 4 (officer accepts holiday gifts from merchants) with a mean score of 2.70.

The fifth is Case 2 (officer accepts free meals, discount on beat) with a mean score of 2.78. The remaining case scenarios have a mean score above the acceptable mean score of 3.00. The sixth is Case 6 (officer accepts auto shop kick backs) with

a mean score of 3.30. The seventh is Case 7 (officer fixes supervisor's car for holiday) with a mean score of 3.55. The eighth is Case 9 (officer accepts drinks to ignore late bar closing) with a mean score of 3.76. The ninth is Case 11 (officer theft from found wallet) with a mean score of 3.85. The tenth is Case 3 (officer accepts bribe from speeding motorist) with a mean score of 4.11. The eleventh, and the scenario considered the most likely that they would report their fellow officers for, is Case 5 (officer stole watch from crime scene) with a mean score of 4.36.

Table 11: *Mean score of officers' willingness to report a fellow officer who commits offence in the scenarios*

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Willingness to Report	N	Mean
(Case1) Officer owns private business.	152	1.49
(Case 10) Officer uses excessive force.	152	2.47
(Case 8) Officer aids drunken police officer.	152	2.54
(Case 4) Officer accepts holiday gifts from merchants.	152	2.70
(Case 2) Officer accepts free meals, discounts on beat.	152	2.78
(Case 6) Officer accepts auto repair shop kickbacks	152	3.30
(Case 7) Officer fixes supervisor's car for holiday.	152	3.55
(Case 9) Officer accepts drinks to ignore late bar closing.	152	3.76
(Case 11) Officer theft from found wallet.	152	3.85
(Case 3) Officer accepts bribe from speeding motorist.	152	4.11
(Case 5) Officer steals watch from crime scene.	152	4.36
Valid N (list wise)	152	

Relationship between Integrity and Code of Silence

The relationship between scores from the ‘would you report a fellow officer’ question which indicates the level of the code of silence and scores from one’s own view of the seriousness of the integrity question was investigated using the Pearsons r. Table: 12 shows the results, there was a strong positive correlation between the two variables ($r=.730$, $p< 0.01$).

Table 12: *Pearsons r correlation of the code of silence question and the own view integrity question.*

Pearsons r		TotCOD	Totint
TotCO D	Pearson	1	.730**
	Correlation		
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	152	152

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Westmarland Corruption Category

The data in Table: 13 show the mean scores of the respondents' view of the seriousness of the scenarios in the Perception of Integrity Survey. This question elicited the respondents' perception of their own levels of integrity. The scenarios have been grouped into Westmarland's (2005) three categories of corruption the 'Administrative' with a mean score of 3.47, 'Noble Cause' with a mean score of 3.16 and 'Criminal' with a mean score of 4.53. The total mean score of all three categories is 3.72. The results of the integrity question when grouped into Westmarland's categories all have a mean score above 3.00.

Table 13: *Mean score of respondents integrity levels grouped into Westmarland's three categories of corruption.*

Own View	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Administrative	152	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.4776	.75329
Noble Cause	152	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.1645	1.22849
Criminal	152	4.00	1.00	5.00	4.5329	.63473
Total	152	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.7250	.72974
Valid N (list wise)	152					

The data in Table: 14 show the result of the mean scores of the respondents' willingness to report a fellow officer who engages in the offences stated in the

scenarios of the Integrity questionnaire. This question elicits the respondents' perceptions of the level of the code of silence that exists in the organization. The scenarios have been grouped into Westmarland's (2005) three categories of corruption; the 'Administrative' with a mean score of 2.83, the 'Noble Cause' with a mean score of 2.50 and the 'Criminal' with a mean score of 3.90. The total mean score of all three categories together is 3.08. Therefore for corrupt offences categories that are 'administrative' and 'noble cause', officers will most likely not report a fellow officer who commits such offences.

Table 14: *Mean score of respondents' perception of the code of silence grouped into Westmarland's three categories of corruption.*

Willingness to Report Fellow Officer	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Administrative	152	1.00	5.00	2.8539	1.01693
Noble Cause	152	1.00	5.00	2.5066	1.35195
Criminal	152	1.00	5.00	3.9046	1.11949
Total	152	1.00	5.00	3.0884	1.04021
Valid N (list wise)	152				

The relationship between scores from variables 'Integrity' and 'Code of Silence' were further categorized into Westmarland's three forms of police corruption (1)

the administrative, (2) noble cause and (3) criminal and were investigated using the Pearsons r statistic. The result of the investigation is illustrated in Table: 15. Significant, positive relationships were observed between scores on the Integrity 'administrative' (ADMint) and the following scores: - Code of Silence 'administrative' (CODadm) ($r = 0.64, p < 0.01$), Code of Silence 'noble cause' (CODnob) ($r = 0.53, p < 0.01$) and Code of Silence 'criminal' (CODcri) ($r = 0.51, p < 0.01$). Significant positive relationships were also observed between scores on the Integrity 'noble cause' (NOBint) and the following scores: - Code of Silence 'administrative' (CODadm) ($r = 0.55, p < 0.01$), Code of Silence 'noble cause' (CODnob) ($r = 0.71, p < 0.01$) and Code of Silence 'criminal' (CODcri) ($r = 0.51, p < 0.01$). The results of the Integrity 'criminal' are as follows: - Code of Silence 'administrative' (CODadm) ($r = 0.43, p < 0.01$), Code of Silence 'noble cause' (CODnob) ($r = 0.31, p < 0.01$) and Code of Silence 'criminal' (CODcri) ($r = 0.55, p < 0.01$). The last of the results although significant and positive were weak in their correlations.

Table 15: *Pearsons r correlations of Integrity and Code of Silence, categories into administrative, noble cause and criminal.*

Pearsons r		CODadm	CODnob	CODcri
ADMint	Pearson	.641**	.531**	.517**
	Correlation			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	152	152	152
NOBint	Pearson	.554**	.713**	.511**
	Correlation			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	152	152	152
CRIint	Pearson	.437**	.309**	.550**
	Correlation			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	152	152	152

**, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Organizational Commitment

Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the results of the Organizational Commitment Survey. Table: 16 shows that the minimum score was 3.75 and the maximum was 7.00; the mean score was 5.99.

Table 16: *Descriptive statistics of respondents' scores on the Organizational Commitment Survey*

Org. Com. Survey	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
OCtot	152	3.25	3.75	7.00	5.9918	.80992
Valid N (list wise)	152					

The data in Table: 17 show the result of a Pearsons r correlation conducted on the scores of the Organizational Commitment questionnaire and the 'willingness to report' question which interprets the level of the code of silence that exists. The results show that a positive relationship of .224, $p > 0.01$ exists between the two variables.

Table 17: *Pearsons r correlation of scores between Organizational Commitment Survey and Code of Silence Question.*

Pearsons r	OCtot	TotCOD
OCtot Pearson	1	.224**
Correlation		
Sig. (2-tailed)		.006
N	152	152

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The data in Table: 18 show the result of a Pearsons r correlation conducted on the mean score of the Organizational Commitment questionnaire and the total mean of the ‘How serious do you consider this behavior to be’ question which interprets the level of the respondents’ integrity. The results show that a positive relationship of .296, $p > 0.01$ exists between the two variables.

Table 18: *Pearsons r correlation of scores between Organizational Commitment Survey and Own View of Integrity Question.*

Pearsons r	OCtot	Totint
OCtot Pearson	1	.296**
Correlation		
Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
N	152	152

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table: 19 show the scores for a question listed in the demographic section of the survey. It requested that respondents indicate their perception of whether their fellow officers would answer the questionnaire honestly. 52 % of the respondents said ‘YES’ they thought that other officers would answer honestly while 48% said ‘NO’ they would not.

Table 19: *Do you think officers will give honest opinion*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	79	52.0	52.0	52.0
	No	73	48.0	48.0	100.0
	Total	152	100.0	100.0	

Chapter Five

Discussion

The major purpose of this study was to investigate the perceptions of the levels of integrity held by police officers of the TTPS which would assist in understanding the levels of corruption that exist in the organization. Corruption being the reverse of integrity, hence, a lack of integrity alludes to a penchant for corruption. Additionally, this research examines the perception officers have of the levels of code of silence that exist in the TTPS. Correlation investigations are also conducted to reveal the relationship between the officers' perception of their integrity and their code of silence, and whether these concepts are related to officers' organizational commitment.

A survey of one hundred and fifty-two officers of the TTPS was conducted and the data was analysed using the SPSS. The results showed that officers of the TTPS perceived their levels of integrity as high therefore, unlikely to be corruptible. Results also show that officers have a high allegiance to the code of silence that exists among officers. Interestingly, the results also showed a strong positive correlation between the officers, integrity and code of silence. The results also revealed that officers believe that the use of excessive force by officers is not a serious offence.

Levels of Integrity

The main purpose of this study was to determine the effects of the code of silence on the perception of members of the TTPS integrity. The results to the question of their own views of the seriousness of the corrupt acts in the eleven scenarios in Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator obtained in this study of the TTPS as shown in Table: 10, bears similar consistency to the results observed by Klockars (2000) of police officers in the United States. Klockars utilised this question in the survey to evaluate the perception police officers have of their levels of integrity. A higher mean score (above 3.00) indicates a higher the level of integrity, lower scores (below 3.00) indicates the opposite of integrity thus, an acceptance of corruption.

Klockars's results include three scenarios in which mean scores were below 3.00; Case 1 (off duty operation of security system business), Case 2 (receipt of free meals) and Case 4 (receipt of holiday gifts). Also, one scenario, Case 8 (cover up of a police accident that involves driving under the influence of alcohol) had a mean of exactly 3.03. These results demonstrate a low level of integrity and an acceptance of the corrupt acts. These were deemed by respondents in Klockars's research to not be serious infringements of police rules and laws.

The TTPS results however had only Case 1(off duty operation of security system business) with a mean score below 3.00. Based on the results obtained, the TTPS

officers considered the other ten case scenarios to be very serious infringements of the law. In Klockars's survey of the United States police officers, seven of the case scenarios Case 10 (use of excessive force), Case 7 (supervisor offers subordinate time off for tuning up his personal car), Case 9 (acceptance of free drinks for ignoring a late bar closing), Case 6 (receipt of a kickback), Case 11 (stealing from a found wallet), Case 3 (accepting a money bribe) and Case 5 (stealing a watch at a crime scene) have mean scores above 4.00. This indicates that the infringements were considered to be very serious offences. Whilst the TTPS officers scored five case scenarios numbers 7 (supervisor offers subordinate time off in return for tuning up his personal car), 9 (acceptance of free drinks for ignoring a late bar closing), 11 (stealing from a found wallet), 3 (accepting a money bribe) and 5 (stealing a watch at a crime scene) with a mean score above 4.00, Cases 10 (use of excessive force), and 6 (receipt of a kickback) were perceived to be not very serious.

Interestingly, with the exception of one main issue, the order of merit of the most serious of the case scenarios does not vary when one compares the two police organisations. Both groups agree that the three cases that are most serious are Cases 11 (stealing from a found wallet), 3 (accepting monetary bribe) and 5 (stealing a watch at a crime scene). The cases considered least serious however, differ considerably. The U.S. officers considered Cases 1 (off duty operation of security system business), 2 (receipt of free meals), 4 (receipt of holiday gifts) and 8 (cover up of a police accident that involves driving under the influence of alcohol) in that

order to be the least serious; whilst the TTPS officers considers Case 1 (off duty operation of security system business), Case 10 (use of excessive force), 8 (cover up of a police accident that involves driving under the influence of alcohol) and 4 (receipt of holiday gifts) to be the least serious. The major disparity is Case 10 (use of excessive force), which TTPS officers consider the second least serious offence. This gives credence to Harriott (2000) historical background of the culture of Caribbean Police Services which he described as steeped in the para-militaristic attitude of policing with force.

Consequently as revealed in Table: 10 the following null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis,

1. (Ho): There are no decreases in officers' perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

(H1): There are decreases in officers' perception of their levels of integrity when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

The Code of Silence

There is a marked difference in the mean scores of TTPS officers for the question ‘own view of seriousness’ of the eleven case scenarios that elicits their perception of their integrity and the question ‘willingness to report a fellow officer’ which elicits the levels of the code of silence that exist among TTPS officers. As Table : 11 indicates the first five scenarios in order of merit from the least serious all have a mean score of less than 3.00 out of 5.00. This indicates that TTPS officers are not likely to report a colleague who commits the following offences Case 1 (off duty operation of security system business), Case 10 (use excessive force), Case 8 (cover up of a police accident that involves driving under the influence of alcohol), Case 4 (receipt of holiday gifts) and Case 2 (receipt of free meals). Only the last two case scenarios in order of merit have a mean score of above 4.00. They are Case 3 (accepting a money bribe) and Case 5 (stealing a watch at a crime scene). Klockars in his survey of U.S. police officers observed similar results with four case scenarios Cases 1, 2, 4 and 8 with mean scores under 3.00 in his research of the code of silence. The marked difference between the U.S. and TTPS officers is again Case 10 (use of excessive force). This scenario is ranked as the second least likely offence to be reported supporting the opinion of Harriott that the view that TTPS officers hold of policing is still very para – militaristic in nature. Klockars (2000) survey of the U.S. police showed that the willingness to report a fellow officer who uses excessive force had a mean score of 3.39. The mean score of TTPS officers for the said scenario is 2.47. There is a strong indication from these results that there exists a culture of a code of silence among TTPS officers. This

however is not unique to the TTPS as similar results were observed by Klockars in the United States, in Sweden and Croatia by Ekenwall (2003) and in Japan by Johnson. The officers of the TTPS differ markedly however in maintaining a code of silence in the ranking of Case 10 (excessive use of force) which is the second least likely offence for which a police officer would be reported by his colleagues.

The following null hypothesis therefore is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis,

2. (Ho): There are no increases in officers' perception of their levels of code of silence when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

(H1): There are increases in officers' perception of their levels of code of silence when confronted with different acts of police corruption.

The Relationship between the Code of Silence and the Perception of Integrity

In order to comprehend whether the code of silence maintained by the officers of the TTPS influences their perception of their integrity, a statistical investigation was conducted to validate the relationship between the two variables. Pearsons r statistics were utilised in the investigation. The results in Table 12 illustrates that there was a strong positive correlation between them ($r = .730, p < 0.01$). A strong positive correlation means that officers of the TTPS who have a high mean score in their “Would you report a fellow officer?” question (code of silence) and thus would more likely report their colleagues for the commission of the offences, also have a similar high score in their perception of integrity. Whilst officers who have low means scores in their “Would you report a fellow officer?” question (code of silence) and will not report their colleagues for the offences committed, also have low mean scores in their perception of their integrity. A low mean score in the perception of integrity indicates a propensity or tolerance for corruption. To understand the importance of this correlation the effect size or the coefficient of determination was calculated by squaring r (.730) which equals .53 or 53%. A 53% coefficient of determination means that 53% of the variance in the officers’ code of silence can be explained by the variance in their perception of their integrity. There is a strong association between the two variables. It should be noted however, that correlations do not show causal relationships (Bastick & Matalon). Therefore, the following null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative,

3. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers’ perception of their levels of integrity and their levels of code of silence.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their levels of code of silence.

Westmarland's Corruption Category

In Table 13 the Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator was categorized into Westmarland's three categories of corruption which are the administrative, the noble cause and criminal. The results of the descriptive statistic revealed that for the question on the TTPS officers' own view of seriousness which illustrates their levels of integrity, the three categories of corruption all have a mean score above 3.00. Noble cause corruption was considered the least serious with a mean of 3.16. Administrative corruption had a mean of 3.47 and criminal corruption was considered the most serious with a mean score of 4.5. The high mean scores indicate that the TTPS officers perceived their integrity to be very high. This result is in stark contrast to the results in Table 14 on the question of willingness to report a fellow officer which indicates the parameter of the code of silence culture that exist in the TTPS. Both administrative and noble cause corruption mean scores are under 3.00 at 2.8 and 2.5 respectively. Scenarios that are categorised as criminal corruption have a mean score of 3.90 and as such are offences which officers of the TTPS are willing to report their fellow officers for. This result indicates a high level of code of silence for offences that are not criminal in nature.

Furthermore, in Table: 18 a more in depth examination of the correlation of officers' code of silence and their perception of their integrity were conducted. Each variable was further subdivided into Westmarland's three categories of corruption; the administrative, noble cause and the criminal. The objective of this investigation was to analyse which of Westmarland's categories was the most influential in the correlation between officers' code of silence and their perception of their integrity. In the category 'noble cause corruption' for both the officers' perception of their code of silence and their perception of integrity as illustrated in Table: 15 were the categories most strongly correlated ($r = .71$, $p < 0.01$) with an effect size of fifty percent. This indicates that for infringements categorised as noble cause officers whose perception of their integrity were high, were also most likely to report their fellow officers for the offences. An examination of the flip side reveals that, officers whose scores on their perception of integrity were low thus indicating a greater propensity for corruption, would most likely also have a low score on the "Would you report your fellow officer?" question hence, are more likely not to report their fellow officers for the offences. The noble cause category of corruption therefore is the most influential in the relationship between officers' perception of their integrity and their perception of their code of silence.

The other two categories administrative and criminal also showed satisfactory correlations between their code of silence and their perception of integrity.

Offences categorized as administrative are correlated at ($r = .64$, $p < 0.01$) with an effect size of forty-one percent. Whilst offences categorized as criminal are correlated at ($r = .55$, $p < 0.01$) with an effect size of thirty percent. Therefore the following null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative,

4. (H₀): The noble cause category of corruption does not influence the relationship between officers' integrity and code of silence.

(H₁): The noble cause category of corruption does influence the relationship between officer's integrity and code of silence

Organizational Commitment Survey

In order to ascertain the extent of the influence of the code of silence on the integrity of officers in the TTPS a comparison investigation of their commitment to the TTPS organization was also conducted. This investigation also attempted to differentiate the officers' allegiance to the TTPS from that of their commitment to the code of silence. The descriptive statistics of the Organizational Commitment Survey are presented in Table 16. It revealed that the mean score is 6.00 (5.99) out of a maximum of 7.00. This indicates a high commitment to the TTPS by its officers.

Further statistical investigations were conducted to ascertain whether the TTPS officers' high commitment to the organization was closely related to their

perception of their levels of integrity. Pearsons r statistics were utilised to investigate if a relationship exists between the TTPS officers' results from the Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator and the Organizational Commitment Survey. The results in Table 18 identified the existence of a positive two-tailed significance correlation however, the relationship was very weak at ($r = .296$, $p < 0.01$). This result could occur by chance. This indicates that there are no meaningful correlations between the TTPS officers' organizational commitment and their perception of their integrity. As there is not enough sustentative evidence provided the following null hypothesis could not be fully rejected in favour of the alternative;

5. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their commitment to the organization.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers' perception of their levels of integrity and their commitment to the organization.

Similarly, Pearsons r statistics were utilised to investigate if a relationship exists between the TTPS officers' organizational commitment and their perception of their code of silence. The results in Table 17 identified the existence of a positive two-tailed significance correlation although the relationship was also very weak at ($r = .224$, $p < 0.01$). This result could occur by chance. Furthermore this indicates that there is not any meaningful correlation between the TTPS officers'

organizational commitment and the code of silence that exists among them. As there is not enough sustentative evidence provided, the following null hypothesis could not be rejected in favour of the alternative;

6. (Ho): There is no relationship between officers of the TTPS perception of their code of silence and their commitment to the organization.

(H1): There is a positive relationship between officers of the TTPS perception of their code of silence and their commitment to the organization.

The aim of this study was to evaluate the levels of corruption that exists amongst police officers of the TTPS. The results revealed that the officers genuinely perceive their levels of integrity to be very high and their levels of corruption to be quite low. They however also have strong allegiances to the code of silence that exist among their fellow officers. Also, it was revealed that officers did not believe that the use of excessive force by their fellow officers to be a serious offence and would not report their fellow officers for such offence. This study further investigated the relationship between the levels of integrity and the code of silence as perceived by officers. The results showed a strong positive relationship between the two concepts. The study also investigated the category of corruption that has the greatest effect in the relationship of the two concepts. The examination revealed that noble cause corruption was strongest in influencing the relationship. Further examination of officers' organizational commitment as it relates to their integrity

and code of silence was inconclusive. The result of a the question from the demographic section of the questionnaire which asked if the respondent believed that their fellow officers would answer the questionnaire honestly, yielded an unexpected result which is illustrated in Table 19. Fifty-two percent responded “yes” believing that fellow officers would answer honestly, while forty-eight percent said “no”. Although in the minority, the high forty-eight percent indicates a high level of distrust exist among officers of the TTPS.

The high mean score results of the TTPS officers on their perception of integrity in comparison to other police organizations (Klockars 2000) were quite instructive in nature. The results demonstrate that the members of the TTPS are on par or above in levels of integrity in comparison with other police organizations that completed Klockars Perception of Integrity Indicator research. The results also illustrate that there are no ambiguities in the minds of the TTPS officers as to the severity of the offences described in the scenarios. It is clear that they understood that the offences are unlawful and understand the penalties that are associated with them.

Additionally, in comparison to Klockars (2000) research, officers in the TTPS hold themselves in high regard where their integrity is concerned with only one of the corrupt scenarios Case 1 (off duty operation of security system business) receiving a mean score below 3.00 and as such considered to be not a serious offence. Klockars’ survey of police officers in the United States contained three scenarios

with mean scores below 3.00 - Case 1 (off duty operation of security system business), Case 2 (officer accepts free meals, discount on beat) and Case 4 (officer accepts holiday gifts from merchants).

The levels of integrity of TTPS officers' however, is in contrast to their high level of allegiance to the code of silence that exists within the TTPS. This is a clear demonstration of what Ivkovich (2005) termed 'loyalty valued over integrity'. Although they accept the corrupt acts to be wrong and contrary to their own integrity, they will however not report fellow officers who may commit these said offences. This is especially true of certain offences which Westmarland (2005) deemed to be 'administrative' and 'noble cause' and are particularly not likely to be reported by officers of the TTPS. Offences deemed as 'crimes' however are viewed very seriously and are more likely to be reported when committed by fellow officers.

This disparity of having a high perception of one's integrity while displaying an allegiance to the code of silence was further investigated. The result shows a positive correlation between the two concepts. Therefore officers with high levels of integrity are more likely to report their fellow officers for the commission of corrupt offences. Whilst the officers with low levels of integrity are more likely not to report their fellow officers who commit corrupt offences.

A distinctive element of the culture of the TTPS that was revealed in this study was that officers do not consider the use of excessive force as being either a serious offence or a corrupt act. In order of seriousness, officers of the TTPS view Case 10 (the use of excessive force) as the second least serious offence; it is only surpassed by Case 1 (off duty operation of security system business). This revelation may help to elucidate the deeply cultural manner of policing by which the TTPS operates which indicates that there is an acceptance of violence as a means to curb crime in the society.

The results of this study are valid in any discussion of the professional development of personnel in the TTPS. The present thrust in the TTPS is to modernise the organization with technology, equipment and training for the officers. Discourse of ethical issues leading to a deeper understanding of the role and responsibility of the police officer must be included in training and re training of all officers. As the authority entrusted with keeping the community safe, it is mandatory that the integrity of officers be unquestionable.

Limitations

Whilst the researcher endeavoured to produce a seamless study, certain limitations were unavoidable. The major limitation was the number of respondents to the

survey. This researcher would have liked to survey a larger number of respondents, but it was not possible for officers to be afforded the time needed to complete the survey. The final number of respondents totalled 152. There was also a heavy concentration of respondents who were categorised as task force officers. This limitation occurred mainly due to the small number of ordinary uniformed officers that are present on a daily basis at stations. Another limitation is the limited research on these concepts in studies the TTPS.

Recommendations

There is need for further research into this area of study not only in the TTPS but also the wider Caribbean region. Further analysis of the cultural methods of policing that distinguishes the police in the former British colonies in the Caribbean should be conducted. Harriot's suggestion that this originated from a para-military perspective that used military principles such as force to maintain order, may help to explain the failure of TTPS officers to recognize the use of excessive force as a very serious offence. Changing the mindset of officers towards having greater confidence in the technology of policing and moving away from the use of excessive force has become crucial for policing in the twenty-first century.

Officers are still strongly supportive to the code of silence in favour of fellow officers. As this research demonstrated, a positive correlation exists between the two concepts; hence officers with higher levels of integrity are less likely to support the negativity of the code of silence. Specific indoctrination training should target

developing integrity in officers to combat the lure of the code of silence. Training and development must include an approach that builds officers' integrity as a means of diminishing the negative effect of such allegiance.

Conclusion

Results of this study provided support for the research originally done by Klockar et al (2000) into police officers' perception of their levels of integrity. Klockar used the integrity survey to illustrate the levels of corruption perceived by police officers. The results of this study found that officers of the TTPS perceived their levels of integrity to be very high. This result indicates that the officers' perceptions of their levels of corruption are very low. Further investigation into officers' allegiance to a code of silence among their peers revealed that a strong bond existed among officers of the TTPS. Additionally, the research uncovered a strong correlation existing whereby officers, who perceived their levels of integrity to be low, possess a high sense of allegiance to the code of silence. Officers who perceived their levels of integrity to be high had a low sense of allegiance to the code of silence.

Results of this study also provided an unanticipated revelation that officers of the TTPS do not consider the use of excessive force to be a serious offence. This is in direct opposition to studies conducted by Klockars (2000) in the United States and

Johnson, D. (2003) in Japan where the use of excessive force is considered a serious corrupt offence.

This study can be considered a good impetus towards a paradigm shift to a research based initiative for training in policing. There is a need for the development of a Caribbean centric method of policing that is based on empirical research and modern technology.

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How many

Appendix A

Policing for the People of Trinidad and Tobago: The Integrity Factor

Derryck Espinoza
Department of Criminology,
University of the West Indies.
Phone: 767-7014

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Officer,

I am Derryck Espinoza a post graduate student of the Criminology Department of the University of the West Indies. I am seeking your assistance in completing the attached questionnaire. The information collected from you is for the purpose of completing my research project entitled “Policing for the people of Trinidad and Tobago the integrity factor”. The questionnaire is divided into three sections:

1. The Perception of Integrity Indicator which ask questions about your level of integrity.
2. The Organizational Commitment Survey which asks questions on how committed you are to the Police Service.
3. A Bio- data questionnaire which ask basic questions about yourself.

The entire questionnaire should take approximately twenty minutes to complete. Be assured that no information obtained will be used in any manner other than the research or would it be divulged to anyone. Your identity or regimental number is **not** to be placed on the questionnaire. Your assistance is voluntary. If you are desirous of obtaining any further information I can be contacted at the number above.

Thank you for your assistance.

Derryck Espinoza

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following pages you will be asked to evaluate eleven descriptions of a Police Officer's behaviour that may depart from official department policy.

In each instant you should assume that the Officer in question has been a Police Officer for five years; has not been previously disciplined and that the Officer has a good work record. Please do not make any other assumptions about the incidents or the officer.

For each incident you will be asked the same two questions. These questions ask you to give your opinion about the seriousness of the behaviour. To do so you must CIRCLE a number on the five point scale that appears beneath each question.

Please remember that we are only asking for your PERSONAL OPINION in these matters. Your answer does not in any way imply that you have participated in or are aware of any such behaviour in your organisation.

SECTION A

CASE 1

A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

1. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2

3

4

5

2. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

CASE 2

A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

3. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Policing for the People of Trinidad and Tobago: The Integrity Factor

Not at all serious

Very serious

1 2 3 4 5

4. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1 2 3 4 5

CASE 3

A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a ticket.

5. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2 3 4 5

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

CASE 4

A police officer is widely liked in the community and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.

7. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2

3

4

5

8. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

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Definitely not

1

2

3

4

Definitely yes

5

CASE 5

A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewellery shop. The display cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch worth about 2 days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch has been stolen during the burglary.

9. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2

3

4

5

10. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

CASE 6

A police officer has a local arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral he receives payment of 5 per cent of the repair bill from the shop owner.

11. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious					Very serious
2	3	4	5		

12. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not					Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5	

CASE 7

Policing for the People of Trinidad and Tobago: The Integrity Factor

A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. His supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune up the supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the supervisor's behaviour.

13. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2

3

4

5

14. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

CASE 8

At 2:00 a.m. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting the accident and, he transports the driver to his home.

15. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

1 2 3 4 5

16. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1 2 3 4 5

CASE 9

A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

17. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2 3 4 5

18. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

CASE 10

Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

19. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2

3

4

5

20. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

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Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

CASE 11

A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property but keeps the money for himself.

21. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be?

Not at all serious

Very serious

2

3

4

5

22. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behaviour?

Definitely not

Definitely yes

1

2

3

4

5

SECTION B

ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT

Please circle the number that best describes your answer to the statement. There is no right or wrong response to the statement. Please provide an honest response to each statement.

1. I am willing to put a great deal of effort beyond what is normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree	

2. I feel very little loyalty to this organization.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree	

3. I am proud to tell others I am part of this organization.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree	

4. This organization really inspires my best job performance.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Strongly Agree

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Agree

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Agree

How old are you? _____ Years Old

Policing for the People of Trinidad and Tobago: The Integrity Factor

What is your gender? (1) Male (2) Female

3. What is your rank?

- (1) Constable (2) Corporal (3) Sergeant
(4) Inspector (5) First Division Officer

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- (1) Secondary (2) Associates Degree (3) Bachelor's Degree
(4) Masters and Above

years have you been in the TTPS? _____ Years

Please circle below the range in which your average net monthly income (after taxes) falls. Please include income from your job and from other sources if there are any.

(1) 0-500 (2) 501-1000 (3) 1001-2000 (4) 2001-3000

(5) 3001-4000 (6) 4001-5000 (7) 5001-6000 (8) 6001-7000

(9) 7001-8000 (10) 8001-9000 (11) 9001-10000 (12) 10001-11000

(13) 11001-12000 (14) 12001-13000 (15) 13001-14000

(16) 14001-15000 (17) 15001-16000 (18) above 16000

What is your assignment in the TTPS?

Station/Clerical Officer

(2) Uniform Patrol Officer

(3) Task Force/Operations Officer
Special Branch).

(4) Special Assignment (Detective, Narcotics,

8. Do you think most police officers would give their honest opinion in filling out this questionnaire?

1. YES

2. NO

9. Did you?

1. YES

2. NO